COMMENTS
RECOVERY OF DAMAGES IN CLASS ACTIONS
In December of 1961 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit added its voice to the quarter-century old debate on the function
of the class action under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1
by permitting absent class members to participate in a judgment in favor
of the class even though the court assumed that they would not have
been bound by a judgment adverse to their interests. The case, Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Balsley,2 was a class action for treble damages
brought by thirty-six vanadium mine owners against two large mining
companies under section 4 of the Clayton Act s and sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.4 In providing the four thousand absent mine owners with
an opportunity to take advantage of the favorable decree the court expressly adopted the position advocated by Kalven and Rosenfield 5 as
against the majority view first urged upon the courts by Professor Moore. 6
From the outset this debate has focused upon the class action as a means
of recovering damages for an injured class, even though the class action is
probably more important as a means of obtaining injunctive relief for a
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 28: "(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them,
one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of
all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against
the class is (1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled
to enforce it; (2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or (3) several, and
there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common
relief is sought.
"(b) .. .
"(c) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be enforced is one defined in
paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
If the right is one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be
given only if the court requires it."
2 800 F.2d 561, 587-90 (10th Cir. 1961).
3 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
4 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958).
5 Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L.
Rkv. 684 (1941).
6 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrIcE
23.01-23.24 (2d ed. 1948).
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minority group which is the subject of illegal discrimination and of preventing multiple adjudications which might result in orders directing the
defendant to adopt two or more irreconcilable courses of conduct.7 Since
the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States has proposed a drastic revision of rule 23,8 an
analysis of the class action as a device for the recovery of damages is
timely.
In his treatise9 and earlier writings 10 Professor Moore has set forth
the understanding which apparently guided the Advisory Committee in
drafting rule 23.11 According to Moore, the rule restates the prior learning on the subject of class actions by its tripartite classification of them
according to the "jural relationships" of the members of the class. 12
Beyond its being an exhaustive description of the circumstances in which
a class suit may be maintained, rule 23 on its face attaches no significance
to this classification. However, Moore states that this is so only because
the Advisory Committee was of the opinion that the significance of the
classification lay in areas of law more substantive than procedural' 3 and
therefore outside the Committee's competence. What they really had in
mind, we are told, was that each category of class action be keyed to
historical differences in the extent to which the judgment in a class action
would be binding on absent class members and to differences in federal
jurisdictional requirements.14 Accordingly the "true" class action, corresponding to rule 23(a)(1), should function to bind in personam absentee
members of the class whose joinder, but for the class action device, would
be compulsory. Its secondary function should be to permit the jurisdic7 See CommiTrrRE ON RuLEs
OF THE UNITED STATES,

or

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE

PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES

CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DIsnucT COURTS

OF

95-98 (1964).

8 Ibid.
9 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.01-23.04 (Ist ed. 1938).
10 Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32
ILL. L. REv. 555 (1938); Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REv. 307 (1937).
11 United States Supreme Court, Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of
the United States with Index and Notes, S. Doc. No. 101, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 240-42
(1939). The notes to rule 23 incorporate Moore's analysis by reference. However, with
respect to the common question suit under subparagraph (3) the cases cited in the notes
reached results different from those advocated by Moore in that they appear to hold
that the judgment in a common question suit is binding upon the absentee members
of the class. Note, Class Actions and Interpleader: CaliforniaProcedure and the Federal
Rules, 6 STAN. L. REV. 120, 138-41 (1953).
12 Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 314, 325 (1937).
13 See Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the
PreliminaryDraft, 25 GEo. L.J. 557, 570-76 (1937).
14 Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32
ILL. L. REV. 555, 556 (1938).
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tional amount to be satisfied by aggregating the claims of the class members who are original parties to the suit. 15 The "hybrid" class action, corresponding to rule 23(a)(2), should operate as a final adjudication of the
rights of absent class members to specific property before the court, and
as a device to circumvent the jurisdictional amount by requiring only that
each of the class members who originally brought the action have a claim
for the requisite amount.16 The "spurious" class action, corresponding to
rule 23(a)(3) should function as a permissive joinder device which circumvents the requirement for a jurisdictional amount in the same manner as
does the "hybrid" suit, but which is not res judicata as to absent members of the classy All three class actions should function to avoid the requirement of complete diversity in that it need only be satisfied by the
8
class members who are original parties to the suit.'

It should be noted that although Moore states that the three categories
of rule 23 are keyed to the binding effect of the judgment, it was the
intent of the Advisory Committee that the rule be silent on the subject.
Thus it is materially incomplete and stands only as an invitation to the
courts to prescribe the substantive consequences. To this extent it is
really no rule at all since it does not regulate the behavior of the courts. 19
For example, there is nothing in the rule that would prevent a court from
framing the judgment in a common question class suit to bind absentee
members of the class, whether the judgment is favorable to their interests
or not. Professor Moore was clearly troubled by the Committee's failure
to key the classification to jurisdiction and res judicata as he had proposed; but "nowise discouraged at being thus locked out at the front
door, Mr. Moore soon contrived to slip in by the back door.... So great
is the deserved respect for his treatise, that his scheme about binding outsiders has almost as much influence upon judges as if it had been embodied in Rule 23."20
Kalven and Rosenfield were the first to take issue with the law as
stated by Moore.21 They were concerned that there existed no practical
means of redress for those who, like the individual investor in a reorgan15 Id. at 556. Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REv. 307, 312 (1937).
16 Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32
ILL. L. REV. 555, 559 (1938); Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307,
317 (1937).
Vt Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32
ILL. L. R.Ev. 555, 561 (1938); Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REv. 307,
320 (1937).
18 Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions-Jurisdiction and Effect of Judgment, 32
ILL. L. REv. 555, 565 (1938).
19 Cf. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 5, at 705-07.
20 CHAFSE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurrY 251 (1950).
21 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 5.
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ization case, 22 find themselves "inadvertently holding a small stake in a
large controversy . . . [involving] immensely complex facts and intricate

law, and redress for [which] is likely to involve expense totally disproportionate to any of the individual claims." 23 What was needed was to
bring all the individual claims before the court for simultaneous adjudication.2 4 This could be best accomplished by a common question class
suit,25 as provided in rule 23(a)(3). 26 Although they assumed that class
members who were not formal parties could not be bound by an adverse
judgment, the action would be brought by a member of the class "on
behalf of all, in the sense that if he is successful all may participate in
the result.127 To enable such participation the decree must be held open
while the intervention of absent class members is solicited under judicial
supervision.2 8 However, Moore's interpretation of the rule would not
permit intervention after judgment, 29 and thus the issue was joined.
As to Moore's description of the function of the "spurious" class suit
Kalven and Rosenfield argued that the courts have already abandoned
literal compliance with the diversity requirement in some large group
cases30 and that there is inadequate authority for the proposition that
only the original plaintiffs need satisfy the jurisdictional amount. 31 More
22 Other examples of such persons include "the employee who is entitled to time
and a half for overtime, the stockholder who has been misled by a false statement in a
prospectus, the ratepayer who has been charged an excessive rate, the depositor in a
dosed bank, the taxpayer who resists an illegal assessment, or the small businessman
who has been the victim of a monopoly in restraint of trade .... " Id. at 684.
23 Ibid.
24

Id. at 688.

The plaintiffs' committee, such as employed in corporate reorganizations, is
rejected as a technique because (1) it requires extensive organization and aggressive
solicitation to persuade enough plaintiffs to join the action, (2) such committees are
generally distrusted on the basis of past performance, (3) the publicity necessarily
incident to solicitation may adversely affect innocent defendants, (4) it is inadequate to
overcome the apathy of the many injured parties, and (5) it offers too many opportunities for abuse of the powers of attorney by collusion. Id. at 688-91.
25

26 Since there are few circumstances in which joinder is compulsory, and bankruptcy and reorganization statutes regulate most of the situations in which property is
before the court for distribution or management, the utility of §§ 23(a)(1) and (a)(2)
is negligible. Id. at 703, 705.
27 Id. at 691.
28 Id. at 688, 695.
23.04(3), 23.08 (1st ed. 1938).
29 2 MooRE, FEDmAL PRACTICE
30 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 5, at 704 n.66.
31 Ibid. At present there is conflicting authority as to whether intervening class
members need satisfy the jurisdictional amount, although the majority of cases agree
with Professor Moore that the intervenors need not do so. Amen v. Black, 234 F.2d
12, 16 (10th Cir. 1956); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23
F.R.D. 155, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (dictum); Local 900, Federated Independent Texas
Unions v. Local 776, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 79 F. Supp. 554, 556 (N.D. Tex. 1948)

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[VoL 32:768

importantly, most situations in which a "spurious" class action would be
useful arise under federal laws. Thus in the federal courts the "spurious"
suit performs no function not already performed by permissive joinder
and intervention under rules 20 and 24.32 In addition to these criticisms
Professor Chafee has observed another difficulty with Moore's general
scheme. The cases do not lend themselves to the facile classification of
rule 23, which leaves the non-litigating class members in doubt as to
whether or not they will be bound by the result in the class action. The
rule can become a trap if an absent class member relies on his being
included in the judgment only to discover after the statute of limitations
has run that the action was "spurious" and his motion to intervene untimely.3 3 Participation would avoid this unfortunate consequence.
Kalven and Rosenfield further argued that' a consistent reading of
rule 23 compels the conclusion that participation in the judgment by
absent class members is permitted by the rule. In the first place to require
all class members to become parties would render meaningless the notion
expressed by the rule that the class is represented by the original parties
to the suit. Moreover, the rule is only applicable "if persons constituting
a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all
before the court." Hence, to require them to be made parties results in
the absurdity of saying that even though it is impracticable to do so, they
must be brought before the court anyway. The second line of argument
was that subparagraph (c) is designed to protect absentee members of the
class from unwarranted dismissal or compromise, but this can only have
meaning if there are absentees to protect. Thirdly, since participation in
judgment is characteristic of subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2), there is strong
reason to believe that it is characteristic of (a)(3). 34 Finally, since the
rule says nothing about participation it is at least an open question.
(semble); Shipley v. Pittsburg & L.E. R.R., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa. 1947); Hunter
v. Southern Indem. Underwriters, 47 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Ky. 1942). Contra, Steel v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 164 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1947); Wagner v. Kemper, 13 F.R.D. 128
(W.D. Mo. 1952).
32 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 5, at 704-05. In fairness it must be pointed out
that some of the arguments employed by Kalven and Rosenfield are not without
objection. There is little evidence to support the proposition that the courts are disregarding the diversity requirement. The avoidance of this requirement is clearly
necessary if the federal courts are to try cases involving large groups which arise under
state laws. Even this limited function gives some meaning to the concept of representation in that the original plaintiff is representative of the citizenship of the entire class.
In spite of this weakness Kalven and Rosenfield appear to have the best of the argument. Rule 23(a)(3) as understood by Moore is so different from rules 23(a)(1) and
(a)(2) that its inclusion in rule 23 instead of rule 20 results in much inconsistency and
confusion in the meaning of the terms used.
33 CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 20, at 251-57. See York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143
F.2d 503, 529 (2d Cir. 1944).
34 With respect to this third argument it should be noted that in "true" and
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Independent of its value as a plaintiffs' device, participation in judgment offers a means for reducing multiplicity of litigation and conserving
the courts' time. Moreover, it reduces the number of potential situations
in which different juries reach different conclusions as to the same issue
of fact, thus preventing the kind of over-dramatization of a systemic
malady which destroys confidence in the ability of the courts to administer
justice. Consequently on numerous occasions courts have found themselves persuaded by the utility of the class action as described by Kalven
and Rosenfield 35 in spite of Professor Moore's protestations to the contrary.36 Assuming for the moment that these writers are correct in their
belief that the absent class members could not be bound by an adverse
judgment in a spurious class action, 37 it is submitted that the Kalven and
Rosenfield approach to the problem avoids the central issue, namely
whether the doctrine of res judicata should be extended to permit participation in judgment.
Kalven and Rosenfield argued that whether participation will be permitted can be determined without reference to res judicata because no
attempt is made to bind any party who has not had a full opportunity to
litigate the issues upon which his liabilities or rights of recovery turn.
They dismissed the notion that it is unfair to permit the absentees, who
would not be bound by an adverse result, to make use of the favorable
decree, observing that the defendant has had his day in court and to force
the class to relitigate the issues is to treat litigation as a form of gambling
in which to win one must bear the risk of losing.3s
The courts, however, have long recognized a contrary doctrine. Under
the label of mutuality of estoppel many cases hold that a prior judgment
can be asserted as a bar to further litigation only by one who would have
"hybrid" class actions not only are the absent members allowed to participate in the
judgment, they are bound by it.
35 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Balsley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961); York v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944) (dictum); State Wholesale Grocers, Inc.
v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 24 F.R.D. 510 (N.D. Ill. 1959); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1951); Wilson v. City of Paducah, 100 F. Supp. 116
(W.D. Ky. 1951); Tolliver v. Cudahy, 39 F. Supp. 337 (E. D. Tenn. 1941); Alabama
Independent Serv. Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala.
1939).
36 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.12 (2d ed. 1948) and cases cited therein; Bascom
Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1953) (no participation where
jury trial required); Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Duling, 190 F.2d 797 (6th
Cir. 1951); Lockwood v. Hercules Powder Co., 7 F.R.D. 24 (W.D. Mo. 1947); Abram v.
San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co., 46 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Cal. 1942); Lofther v. First Nat'l
Bank, 45 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ill. 1941).
37 See text accompanying notes 58-68 infra for a discussion of the developments
which now make it possible to bind the absent class members.
38 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 5, at 711-13.
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been bound by that prior judgment had it been adverse.3 9 Although the
courts have been less than articulate in stating the rationale for mutuality
and numerous commentators have attacked it in the interest of reducing
the volume of litigation, 40 the doctrine has shown remarkable durability4 '
and in most jurisdictions has given way only to recognized exceptions in
which agency or suretyship doctrines compel a relaxation of mutuality to
avoid inconsistent liabilities. 42 The only further exception which has
received any substantial degree of recognition is that suggested by Professor Currie in his analysis of Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Sav. &
Trust Ass'n. 43 Under this proposal, one not bound by a prior judgment
will be permitted to assert that judgment as a final adjudication of the
issues previously litigated, but only if the party against whom it is asserted
possessed the strategic advantages of initiative as plaintiff in the prior
action.44 Kalven and Rosenfield on the other hand would have had the
courts abandon mutuality altogether. In effect participation in judgment
would permit persons not bound by a prior judgment to assert that
judgment as a final adjudication of all issues which could have been
litigated in the prior action, even though the one against whom it is
asserted was the defendant in both actions. However, the apparent explanation for the continued vitality of mutuality is the concern on the
part of the courts to avoid the unfairness which would result from the
abandonment of the doctrine in this very situation.
Should mutuality be abandoned by permitting participation in judgment, an inequitable allocation of the risks of litigation between the
class members and the defendant will inevitably result. The defendant
will be forced to risk liability to the entire class while the establishing of
his non-liability with respect to the actual litigants will be the most that
he can gain. This would produce enormous pressures on the defendant
39 E.g., Lawler v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1955); Chase
Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 438 (1934); Bigelow v. Old Dominion
Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912); Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness
of Judgments, 35 TuL. L. R.v. 301 (1961). The court in the Union Carbide case
suggested that res judicata is inapplicable because no final judgment had been entered.
300 F.2d at 587. Though a technically sustainable position, this ignores the policies on
which res judicata and mutuality are grounded.
40 E.g., Cox, Res Adjudicata: Who Entitled to Plead, 9 VA. L. REG. (n.s.) 241 (1923);
Comment, 18 N.Y.U.L. REv. 565 (1941); Comment, 35 YALE L.J. 607 (1926); Note, 35
Ta.xAs L. REV. 137 (1956); Note, 15 U. CINc. L. REv. 349 (1941); Note, 27 VA. L. REv.
955 (1941).
41 Moore & Currier, supra note 39, at 301.
42 Id. at 311-26. E.g., a suit by a creditor against the principal debtor followed by a
suit by the same creditor against the surety.
43 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
44 B. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957).
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to settle with any plaintiff class members whose claim is at all meritorious.
The inequity would occur in its most egregious form should there be
successive class actions by different members of the class. In each suit the
defendant would be risking liability to all those not parties to previous
litigation. Conceivably he could win a number of the suits and yet a
single loss would bring massive liability. Should such a situation arise the
courts ought to protect the defendant by refusing to permit more than one
class action with respect to a single set of issues. Even this restriction does
not prevent an absent class member from awaiting the outcome of the
class action and either participating in a favorable judgment or bringing
an action on his own should the result in the class action be adverse to
the class. If different juries always reached the same result on an issue
there would be no objection to allowing the subsequent actions and no
utility in bringing them. The fact that judges and juries are often inconsistent and witnesses unpredictable demonstrates that there is a certain degree of chanciness to litigation and to require one party to assume
significantly greater risks than his adversary is not only "contrary to
better gambling etiquette," it is unfair. 45
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Balsley46 clearly reveals the circumstances in which this unfairness is most likely to occur and suggests some
possibilities for its control. The thirty-six plaintiffs in this action recovered a multimillion dollar judgment for themselves, and the absent
class members were permitted to come in and prove their own damages.
It so happened that the class action had been instituted only a few months
before the time for bringing the action expired, hence the absentees were
barred from bringing new actions prior to the termination of the class
action. 47 Suppose, however, that prior to the expiration the thirty-six had
failed in their attempt to recover. Unless they were precluded by stare
decisis the absentees almost certainly would have brought individual
suits, each for treble damages for hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Clearly this is not the situation Kalven and Rosenfield had in mind
when they suggested that courts permit participation in judgment. They
were concerned with protecting claimholders whose damages were too
small to justify individual litigation. Such plaintiffs would not as a practical matter have multiple opportunities to establish the defendant's liability. The absent class members would also be prevented from bringing
their own actions after the termination of the class action if the statute of
limitations would bar the individual actions prior to the termination of
the class action. This would occur when either the limitation on actions
See LouisEL.. & HAzARD, CASEs ON
46 300 F.2d 561, 587 (10th Cir. 1961).
45

47 Id. at 587-90.

PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 718-23 (1962).
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is very brief, as in the case of the securities acts, 48 or the class action is

brought close to the end of the period, as in the Union Carbide case.
Perhaps, then, it would be possible to identify a sub-class which could be
permitted to participate in the judgment because its members are unable
to bring individual actions. Their recovery would be as effectively determined by the result in the class action as if they were legally bound by
that result, and the defendant would not incur inequitable risks.
The problem with such a rule is to identify an appropriate sub-class.
Where the statute of limitations is the effective bar to subsequent actions
only those class members who have not filed suits before the statute runs
constitute the sub-class. This prevents absent class members from filing
individual suits and delaying to await the outcome of the class action.
However, this delineation of the sub-class would restrict the operation
of participation in judgment to those situations in which the statute has
run before termination of the class action. So severe and arbitrary a
restriction may require the conclusion that participation is not a broad
enough remedy to justify the effort involved in its administration. Where
the amount of the claim is the effective bar, the sub-class bound by the
class action would consist of all those class members whose individual
claims are for less than the amount necessary to justify undertaking the
suit on one's own or, resorting to a more mechanical form, all those with
claims less than $5,000. The objection to the former delineation of the
sub-class is that it is too uncertain and too difficult of accurate determination, while the latter ignores the great variance in costs and fees depending upon the complexity of the litigation. More important, a group of
claimants unable to maintain individual actions can always join together
in a single suit and share the costs. Thus the absent class members would
be able to bring subsequent actions against the defendant, resulting in
the very unfairness which is sought to be avoided.
Not only does participation in judgment lend itself to abuses difficult
to control, but it would appear that in many circumstances the device
will not be as effective in aiding the small claimholders to maintain the
class action as its proponents have supposed. The chief barrier to the
effectiveness of participation is the lack of funds at the plaintiff's disposal
with which to prosecute the litigation. Kalven and Rosenfield suggested
providing for attorneys' fees and expenses out of the fund recovered on
a quantum meruit basis. 49 However, as Professor Chafee has cautioned,
48 Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1958);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 898 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(c)
(1958). Both acts limit the bringing of actions to one year from the time the misrepresentation was or should have been discovered, but in no event longer than three years
from the time the cause of action accrued.
49 Kalven & Rosenfield,

The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHi.

L. REv. 684, 691, 714-21 (1941).
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"class suits are sometimes lost." 50 In such a case who will provide the
expenses of litigation? The partial solution suggested by Chafee is utilization of the contingent fee. 51 However, a contingent fee requires a contract
between attorney and client, and the attorney cannot possibly contract
with the absent class members, whose recovered damages are the only
adequate source of fees. Hence this device is unavailable, and attorneys
will probably be willing to undertake the litigation only if they expect
the quantum meruit fee to be large enough to justify the risk of receiving
no fee at all.
As an alternative to participation in judgment it has been suggested
that rule 23(a)(3) be regarded as a special instance of permissive joinder
which may be supplemented by direct solicitation of the absent class
members at the outset of the litigation.5 2 Only those who join and share
the expenses would be allowed to benefit from a favorable judgment; thus
the absent class members would have no unfair advantages over the
defendant, and the attorney could secure a contingent or non-contingent
fee contract from the litigating class members. Since the solicitation
would be under the court's supervision it could be made clear at the
outset that no implication of judicial approval of the plaintiff's claims is
intended and the absent class could be protected from misleading propaganda. The names of those to be solicited would usually be available from
the defendant's records on discovery.
However, solicitation has its own species of abuse. Even a carefully
worded notice will produce publicity unfavorable to the defendant, who
is quite possibly innocent, and if the publicity is directed specifically
toward persons upon whose goodwill the defendant is dependent he may
be eager to settle to escape the notoriety. If, for instance, the action is
against a corporation for misstatement in a prospectus, notice to its
stockholders might bring about widespread selling of the corporation's
stock with consequent ill effects on its financial position. In most other
situations the effect of bad publicity probably would be no more severe
than is the case in any litigation.
Solicitation, like participation in judgment, could be a powerful
weapon in the hands of the strike-suiter, who brings lawsuits solely for the
purpose of coercing from the defendant a secret settlement. Either procedure can result in a large judgment and by compromising a claim infinitesimal in comparison the defendant can remove this risk of massive
liability. Although it is true that the court may be able to prevent compromise or abandonment of a class action and thus defeat the strike50 CHAFFE,

op. cit. supra note 20, at 278.

51 Id. at 279.
52 Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962); Hormel
v. United States, 17 F.R.D. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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suiter, the alert practitioner will not at first bring the suit as a class
action. Instead he will count on the defendant to realize that the situation
is so adapted to such procedure that he will wish to settle the claim as
quickly as possible to avoid its becoming a class action at a later stage of
the litigation. To maximize his bargaining power the strike-suiter will
arrange for the settlement to be carried out immediately prior to the time
the statute of limitations will foreclose the bringing of further suits by
the class. Thus by settling this one action the defendant buys total
immunity.
It is important to note, however, that the strike-suiter whose activity
is of special concern is not one whose bargaining power rests solely on
the nuisance value of the suit (i.e., the high cost of litigation to the defendant) but rather one whose action has some chance of succeeding. The
latter performs a valuable policing service since the threat of a strikesuit may deter unlawful behavior. The objection to his activity is that
the recovery belongs not to him but to the whole class, although he is the
only one who benefits. Moreover, the threat of solicitation so increases the
bargaining power of such a strike-suiter that the defendant is forced to
make large settlements for doubtful claims. Even if his chance of success
is one-in-ten, when the potential liability to the class is large it may be
worthwhile for the defendant to settle for an amount much in excess of
any possible claim the strike-suiter may have individually. One important
qualification to this discussion arises from the uncertainty as to whether
such strike-suiters do in fact exist or whether they are figments of the
sensitive imaginations of corporate defendants.5 4 To the extent that
the latter is the case this objection to solicitation loses its force.
Solicitation has proven to be unacceptable to the courts for another
reason: judges suspect that they are being used by lawyers as vehicles for
client solicitation. 55 Indeed the champertous lawyer would be heartened
by the court's adopting this device. He could seek out an initial plaintiff,
solicit the class members for contributions which would cover his immediate needs and face the happy prospect of several hundred thousand dollars
in contingent fees should the action succeed or result in a settlement. However, to some extent the courts' concern is misplaced. If the initial claim
had not been brought into court through champertous activity, the solicitation would not be tainted as such. Had the client on his own initiative
undertaken to bring together some members of the class through private
53

Fa. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (retained in the proposed amendment as subdivision (e)).

54 See generally 2 HORNSTE.I,

CORPORATXON LAW AND PRACrICE

§§ 722,

734 (1959);

Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLuM. L. Ray. 1 (1947).
55 Cases cited note 52 supra.
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solicitation and had this group hired an attorney to bring the action, it
would be difficult to find fault with the behavior of any of the parties.
The step which the court is reluctant to take is the granting of a motion
for discovery which would permit the plaintiff to obtain the information
necessary for effective solicitation, 56 for although the combination of
discovery and solicitation is not champertous in itself, the availability of
such procedure is an incentive to champerty. It would seem that any
violations of the Canons of Professional Ethics 57 which the adoption of
this procedure might bring should be dealt with by more vigorous policing of the bar rather than by the elimination of all means of recovery
which, due to their effectiveness, are necessarily incentives to champerty.
The alternative to all of the above proposals is to permit the absent
class members to be bound by the judgment in the class action, whether it
is favorable or unfavorable to their interests. 58 Indeed this was the
approach taken by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules when it
recently undertook the task of revising rule 23. Subsection (c)(2) of the
proposed rule provides:
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action shall
extend by its terms to the members of the class, as defined,
whether or not the judgment is favorable to them.... To afford
members of the class an opportunity to request exclusion, the
court shall direct that reasonable notice be given to the
class ....G9

Subsection (d)(2) would authorize the court to make orders
requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or
otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given
in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the
members of . . . the proposed extent of the judgment . .

.60

56 Ibid.
57 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

§§

27, 28 (1963).

58 This approach was first suggested in Keefe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben

Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327 (1948), which foresaw the development of notice as a standard
of due process in the substituted service of process permitted by the non-resident
motorist statutes. In only a few cases have the absent class members protested when
courts have extended an adverse judgment in a class action to include them. Hansberry,
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
Presumably they are discouraged from bringing subsequent actions by the effects of
stare decisis and the previous failure of the class to recover a favorable judgment.
59 COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED

STATES, PRELIINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 97 (1964).
60 Id.

at 98.
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The Committee scrapped Moore's categories as unworkable and rejected
participation in judgment and solicitation for reasons not entirely clear
from the Committee's notes. 61
In order to bind the absent class members it is necessary to satisfy the
requirements of due process. 62 This is the purpose of giving notice to the
class. 63 In a dictum in Hansberry v. Lee6 4 the Supreme Court suggested
that there would be no constitutional barrier to "a procedure whereby
some of the members of the class could stand in judgment for all, provided that the procedure were so devised and applied as to insure
that those present are of the same class as those absent and that the
litigation is so conducted as to insure full and fair consideration of the
common issue." 65 A few years later, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co.,66 the Court held that notice was sufficient to satisfy due
process providing it was reasonably calculated to reach those sought to
be bound by the judgment.6 7 Since this development of notice as a
standard for measuring due process was not complete until 1950, it was
unavailable to both Moore and Kalven, and almost all courts have
refused to frame the judgment in "spurious" class actions in terms which
68
would purport to bind the absent class members.
Extending the judgment to the entire class would provide the small
claimholders with an effective means of group redress. The prospect of
a large judgment would be incentive for the plaintiff and his lawyer to
prosecute the action with diligence. Normally the lawyer could expect at
least reasonable fees on a quantum meruit basis, and perhaps the court
would allow him to negotiate with the representatives of the class for a
contingent fee contract which would be binding on the entire class. In
addition, the device permits the courts to clean up a litigious situation
without the inequitable allocation of risks inherent in participation in
judgment.
Unfortunately notification is subject to many of the same objections as
Id. at 98-115.
62 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
61

63 CoMMrrrE ON RuLr s OF PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 59, at 113-14.

64 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
65 Id. at 43.
66 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
67 Id. at 314; see LOUISELL & HAZARD, op. cit. supranote 45, at 718-23.
68 E.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Balsley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir. 1961);
Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1952); Oppenheimer v. F.J.
Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1944); York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d
Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Cutler v. American Fed'n of
Musicians, 211 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 316 F.2d 546 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 941 (1963); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23
F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). But cf. Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941).
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is solicitation. Like solicitation it can be a vehicle for unfavorable publicity and a powerful weapon in the hands of a strike-suiter.6 It may also
be a boon to the champertous lawyer; in fact the Advisory Committee
has cautioned: "Notice is available fundamentally 'for the protection of
the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action'
and should not be used merely as a device for the undesirable solicitation
of claims." 70 But how is a court to determine whether a class action is
brought for champertous purposes if the plaintiff otherwise satisfies the
prerequisites for maintaining a class action? The attorney need not bring
his motives into question by requesting that the class be solicited, as was
the case in Cherner v. TransitronElectronic Corp.,71 for the court must
see to it that the class knows of the litigation. This in itself may be
enough to elicit voluntary financial aid from some of the class members
who are especially concerned with the outcome due to the size of their
claims. If such aid is insufficient the plaintiff may indicate to the court
that he is not able to continue the class action due to lack of funds. In
such circumstances the court will often have no alternative other than to
allow solicitation of the class, because a dismissal without prejudice will
often be impossible since the statute of limitations may have run on many
of those relying upon the action. Thus the champertous attorney is at a
great advantage. He can seek out an initial plaintiff and face the happy
prospect of substantial fees in the event the class recovers damages with
little chance of being entirely unpaid if the action fails.
That there is a policy against champertous conduct by attorneys is
certain. Whether it is well founded is another matter. The case against
champerty rests on the reluctance to permit lawyers to profit by stirring
up conflict. However, in the complexity of modern society it is often very
difficult for the small claimholder to become aware that his rights have
been infringed unless someone with knowledge of the relevant facts and
law alerts him. A stockholder, for instance, can hardly be expected to
comprehend the intricacies of the case law and regulations under the
securities acts as to what constitutes a misstatement in a prospectus even
in the rare case where he is in possession of all the facts. It would appear
then that because of the prohibition against champerty some undetermined number of meritorious claims go unredressed through no fault of
69 See text accompanying note 53 supra. It is not at all clear who will bear the cost
of notice, which will be substantial when the class is numbered in the thousands. The
plaintiff can be said to have volunteered to bear the cost by bringing the action as a
class action. Should the class recover a judgment he could seek reimbursement out of
those funds. However, the immediate expense may be too much for the plaintiff to
bear, in which case the court would have to bear the cost if the action is to continue.
When the court initiates the class action presumably it must provide for the notice.
70 COMMITTrEE ON RuLEs OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, op. cit. supra note 59, at 114.

71 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 1962).
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the injured party. Moreover, where a class action is involved, concern
with the attorney's profiting excessively is somewhat misplaced since his
fees will be awarded by the court on a quantum meruit basis. However,
insofar as the policy against champerty still has force it stands as an
objection to the adoption of solicitation and notification.
It would appear that each of the general procedures which have been
devised to enable the small claimholder to recover is subject to uncontrollable abuses, and the more effective a procedure is in facilitating recovery, the more profitably it can be employed by the strike-suiter and
the champertous lawyer. Hence the adoption of any of them would be
unjustified if more selective and less abusive means of group redress are
available. Kalven and Rosenfield have suggested a number of recurrent
situations in which special means of redress for the small claimholder
may be necessary.7 2 An analysis of these and other situations suggests that
in most of them adequate means exist to enable small claimholders to
recover, and where such means are lacking changes in the substantive law
could correct the deficiency.
For employees suing to recover overtime pay or minimum wages Congress has already provided a class action in which recovery is limited
to those class members who designate the party plaintiffs as their agents. 73
Even in absence of this provision no class action is needed because rule
20 permits persons whose recovery depends upon a common question of
law or fact to join their claims in a single action.7 4 Since the injured
employees are usually concentrated in a relatively small area, there
would be little problem in joining enough claims to make the action
financially feasible. Additional relief is available through the Wages and
Hours Division of the Department of Labor which has the power through
the Secretary of Labor to sue on behalf of employeesY5
Beneficiaries of a common trust fund can be protected by the courts of
equity. Professor Scott notes "there is . . .a modern tendency in the
United States for a court which has supervision over the administration of
trust estates to enforce the duties of trustees even though not called upon
by the beneficiaries to do so."76 Should one beneficiary sue to surcharge
the trustees the court could extend relief to the beneficiaries as a class on
its own initiative, and the beneficiary suing could be reimbursed for his
costs from the trust fund since his efforts benefited all.7 7 These powers of
72 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 49, at 684.

73 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 16(b), 52 Stat. 1069, as amended, 75 Stat. 74
(1961), as amended, 27 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. V, 1964).
74 FaD. R. Civ. P. 20.
75 75 Stat. 74 (1961), 29 U.S.C. §§ 216-17 (Supp. V, 1964).
76 3 Scorr, TRusTs 1506 (2d ed. 1956).
77 See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
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the courts are supplemented in almost every jurisdiction by statutes regulating common trust funds. 78 Some jurisdictions, such as New York, even
provide for the appointment of a guardian to represent the absent beneficiaries in any accounting. 79 Moreover, Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.80 has established a high standard of notice to the
beneficiaries, which must be complied with before an accounting can be
81
res judicata as to their interests.
Taxpayers resisting a special assessment for a sewer line or other improvement are of necessity grouped in a relatively small, well-defined
locality. Thus the identity of the class can be easily ascertained, and a
taxpayer can contact his fellow class members with little difficulty. If the
class is sufficiently interested in resisting the assessment they can hire a
lawyer and join in a single action under rule 20.82
Investors involved in corporate reorganizations are amply protected
by a variety of devices. The protective committee is a well developed institution in this field which has been successful in mobilizing a class of
investors and participating in the litigation on their behalf. Kalven and
Rosenfield distrusted the reorganization committee due to the potential
for collusive activity between the committee and the reorganization
managers, the bankers and corporate officers.8 3 However, this possibility
of collusion has been largely obviated by powers given to the court to
disregard the delegation of authority by investors to the committee
where it appears that the latter is exercising its power unfairly.8 4 Moreover, the committee is required to disclose the circumstances which led
to its organization and the financial stake of its members in the reorganization.8 In addition the SEC has the authority to intervene to attack
the reorganization plan if it is unfair to investors or others.8 6 The class
suit would be an unnecessary appendage to these already complex
proceedings.
The rates charged by public utilities are almost universally regulated
by state and federal utilities commissions.8 7 The constant policing of
2 ScOTT, TRUSTS 1685 n.26 (2d ed. 1956).
N.Y. BANKING LAw § 100-c(12); see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &:
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
8o 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
81 Ibid.
82 The same factors would be operative in any case where landowners' property has
been injured due to the activity of another party (e.g., riparian owners suing for
diversion of water).
83 Kalven & Rosenfield, note 49, at 684, 688-91 (1941); see note 25 supra.
84 Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 612 (1958).
85 Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 895 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 611 (1958).
86 Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 894 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 608 (1958).
78
79

87

E.g., ILL. REv.

STAT.

ch. 111 2/3 (1963).
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fixed rates in itself reduces the chance of overcharges. However, obtaining
an injunction against overcharges is often a lengthy business even for a
commission, and in the meantime the ratepayers will have been paying
the excessive rate. To remedy this the regulatory law could be amended
to require the utility company to place the alleged excess in a fund
during the pendency of the injunctive action. Should the injunction be
granted the fund would be redistributed among the ratepayers. A similar
procedure is now available to the FPG under the Natural Gas Act.88 If
it is felt that an easily utilized civil action by ratepayers is essential to the
enforcement of regulation, the act could provide for a class action permitting participation in judgment, since the individual claims will almost
always be too small to justify subsequent actions. Notification or solicitation would be too expensive due to the large size of the class.
Stockholders suing a corporation for misrepresentation in a prospectus
or suing the directors for mismanagement have often attempted to utilize
the class action. Yet it is this situation which most easily lends itself to
the abuses inherent in notification, solicitation, or participation. Absent
these devices the small claimholder will sometimes be able to join with
a plaintiff whose claim is large enough to warrant an individual suit,8 9
but this is often not possible due to the dispersion and anonymity of
stockholders. To facilitate such joinder the SEC could be given authority
to act as a clearing house for information concerning pending suits by
stockholders anywhere in the United States. The necessary information
could be given to any stockholder upon his request; in addition the
Commission could bring together those stockholders who have requested
such information but who have not yet filed suit. If this were felt to be
inadequate to protect the class and to deter misrepresentations Congress
could authorize the SEC to sue on behalf of the stockholders or to give
them notice of the alleged misrepresentations.
In the vast majority of cases depositors in a bank which has failed
will not need a class action. Federal deposit insurance, which covers all
but a small percentage of bank deposits, 90 will prevent injury to those
depositors with $10,000 or less in their accounts. Those with claims for
greater amounts usually will have a large enough stake in the outcome
to warrant bringing their own actions. In addition depositors ordinarily
reside in the locality of the bank, making joinder feasible.
88 52 Stat. 822 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1958); see Atlantic Ref. Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1958).
89 See, e.g., Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 221 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1963).
90 Of the $365,262 millions on deposit in banks, $313,304 millions were insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, leaving only 14.2% of all deposits uninsured.
Moreover, only about 3% of all banking institutions are uninsured. BUEAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNrrED STATES 457 (1964).
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Insofar as reliance upon an administrative agency is the alternative to
some form of class action it must be recognized that proceedings before
these agencies may lend themselves to abuses similar to those inherent
in class actions. Where the agency proceedings are judicial in form the
attraction of even quantum meruit fees may incite the champertous
attorney. Where the agency conducts its own investigation independent of
the parties the threat of involvement with the agency may provide
leverage for extortion similar to that practiced by the strike-suiter. However, this would be a much less effective technique than that of the
strike-suiter for there is no effective way to prevent either the person
threatening to alert the agency or other members of the class from
subsequently involving the agency. At present there is no indication that
unscrupulous attorneys have made such use of agency proceedings.
It would appear that in the circumstances in which some form of
class action could usefully be employed, there are or could be made available other more selective procedural remedies which for the most part
avoid the abuses of the class action and yet facilitate recovery by the
small claimholder. Subsection (b)(3) of the proposed revision of rule 23
provides that a class action which is based only on the existence of a
"common question" shall be permitted only if it "is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." 91 Where a class action is brought to recover damages this provision, if adopted, should be strictly construed to limit the use of the
class action to those situations in which other methods of redress are
unavailable, that is, where the class is dispersed and the claims small, and
no aid from an administrative agency is available. The rule, so construed,
is clearly superior to existing rule 23 which has been clouded by interpretations that render it confusing and self-contradictory.9 2 Should the proposed rule not be adopted all of the problems of notification, solicitation,
and participation in judgment will still exist because rule 23 as it now
stands does not forbid the use of any of these procedures. Hence the
Supreme Court may be called upon to decide which ones are appropriate.
An ideal solution will be impossible, because any procedure that makes it
easy for a class to recover damages necessarily creates a potential for
abuse.
91 Co

cit. supra note 59, at 96.
EQUITY 244-61 (1950); Co~mITTEE ON RULES OF
op. cit. supra note 59, at 98-101; Kalven & Rosenfield, supra
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